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The current thinking in the nuclear energy industry is favoring by small-scale Small 
Modular Reactors (SMRs) with improved safety and multiple applications compared to 
conventional large-size nuclear power plants. The demand for SMR is increasing in places 
where existing large-scale nuclear power plants are not applicable, such as developing 
countries with distributed power generation areas, small power grid capacity, heating 
demand in remote areas, and seawater desalination. 
Currently, cooperative research between Generation IV Information Forum (GIF) member 
countries is actively underway. SMRs are being evaluated as a major development 
direction for the nuclear energy industry. However, SMRs reactor facilities have not yet 
been deployed in commercial operation, and research and development is ongoing. 
External leakage of radioactive material from accidents can pose a very serious risk to 
workers and the public. Therefore, nuclear facilities must meet the regulatory standards of 
the regulatory body, from construction to operation and accident management. 
However, it is inappropriate to consider the characteristics of SMRs and then apply the 
current regulatory standards to SMRs. In this report, a literature review method was used 
to characterize SMRs. The main technical standards were examined to determine which 
items were found to be inadequate for SMRs based on the characteristics of the SMRs. As 
a result, four characteristics were derived. Then, an alternative to the regulatory criteria for 
siting and operation was derived. Improvements in operations and siting related regulatory 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
As a low-carbon energy source, nuclear energy has been regarded as a sustainable clean 
energy source capable of addressing global warming. However, since the Fukushima Dai-
Ichii accident [1], the nuclear energy industry crisis has arrived. The safety issue of 
nuclear power plants has risen, and nuclear power plant accidents, which were considered 
to be unavoidable accidents, has amplified distrust of nuclear energy and caused the 
public to lose confidence in nuclear energy. Some countries that have nuclear energy 
have discussed shut-down and phase-out of nuclear power plants, and the trend of 
expanding the development of renewable energy has been accelerated [2].  
The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident taught that severe accidents once considered highly 
improbable are something that can happen. As a result, the development direction of 
future nuclear power plants will be strengthened not only to prevent accidents but also to 
mitigate potential accidents. Therefore, it is considered that the concept of a fully passive 
safety system design of nuclear power plants is no longer an option but a necessity. Also, 
fully passive safety systems alone are no longer considered sufficient. 
Due to the atmosphere of the nuclear power generation industry, the necessity and 
demand of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) is increasing in part due to advantages such 
as improvement of stability and reduction of construction cost compared with 
conventional large nuclear power plants. Demand for SMRs is growing in applications 
where it is impossible or difficult to apply the existing large-scale nuclear power plant, 
such as, power and heating demand in remote areas (low energy requirement), developing 
countries with small power grid capacity, and special applications such as desalination. 
As a result, the proportion of SMRs is expected to rise in the near future nuclear industry 
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market. According to a report of the National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) 'Small Modular 
Reactors (SMR) Feasibility Study'[3], specific projections for SMR capacity do not exist, 
however comparison between the analyses conducted for USA, Russia, and China and the 
top-down projections for these nations yields that by 2035 an averaged figure for SMR 
take-up of around 20% of the existing nuclear power plants compared to the total 
potential nuclear market in those nations. 
‘The Technology Roadmap Update’, released in 2014 in the Generation IV International 
Forum (GIF), defined and planned the R&D required to achieve the four goals and enable 
the deployment of Gen IV nuclear energy systems from 2030 [4]. Figure 1 shows the four 
generations of reactor designs. 
 
 
Figure 1. The four generations of reactor designs [4]. 
 
The SMR technology, although based on Generation I principles is expected to be largely 
Generation IV designs. Understanding principles of SMRs is essential to establishing 




construction characteristics of SMRs differentiated from existing large nuclear power 
plants allow some of the following features: 
(1) Fully passive safety systems: system operation by gravity, natural circulation, 
or gas compression power; 
(2) Underground construction of containment buildings; 
(3) Improvement of equipment production and transportability: Design and 
manufacture of nuclear reactor internalization and integration; 
(4) Differentiation of siting: remote area, mining area, or small-scale electricity 
demand place (small and medium city). 
These characteristics enable SMRs to be compared to existing nuclear power plants to 
improve stability, reduce construction time, and reduce initial investment costs. In 
addition, flexibility in power capacity due to the modular construction makes it possible 
to respond quickly to changes in economic conditions and demand. 
SMRs are very small in physical scale compared to existing nuclear power plants, and 
electric power is also proportionally small. Although there are now a variety of new 
technology-based reactor types currently under development, SMRs designs are not yet 
licensed and have not commenced commercial operation. In addition, it is a module 
format that connects multiple SMRs to set the output changing the nature of the risk. Due 
to the physical size and the new design, the scale and occurrence of accidents are very 
different from those of existing large nuclear power plants. Therefore, it is not 
appropriate to license and regulate SMRs by applying regulatory guidelines of existing 
large nuclear power plants. And, it seems that the need for new regulatory guidelines is 
crucial to the licensing and regulation of SMRs. 
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As such, the demand for SMRs is expected to increase due to the need for small-size, 
multi-purpose nuclear power plants and the need to improve the safety of nuclear 
facilities in the future. However, since SMRs differ from large nuclear power plants, 
which are currently in operation, with different nuclear fuel, engineered safety features, 
and/or design characteristics, it is necessary to establish a new regulatory direction or 
modify existing regulations. For this reason, this report explores the characteristics of 
SMRs and suggests appropriate regulatory guidelines for SMRs through literature review 
of existing regulatory guidelines for nuclear power plants. As part of the work, a review 
and investigation shall be completed of current safety standard and regulatory guides and 
the characteristics of SMRs. Then, the results of the literature review, the presentation of 





Chapter 2. Literature review  
This chapter describes the literature review of trends in the global nuclear energy market, 
the definition of SMRs and their differentiation, in terms of purpose and characteristics 
from existing nuclear power plants. 
2.1 Nuclear energy policy in the world  
At present, countries that are planning to utilize nuclear energy are showing a variety of 
trends such as shutdown, maintenance, and expansion of nuclear power plants in 
accordance with the status of energy availability and energy policies. According to the 
World Energy Outlook 2018 of the International Energy Agency (IEA) [5], Germany and 
Belgium have decided to abolish nuclear power, while France, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Japan, and South Korea are planning to gradually reduce the proportion of nuclear power. 
At the same time, about 20 countries, including China, India, Russia, the UAE, and Saudi 
Arabia, are seeking to expand nuclear power. IEA estimates that the capacity of nuclear 
installations worldwide is expected to increase. The projected scenarios for facility 
capacity are divided into three categories: New Policy Scenario (NPS), Current Policy 
Scenario (CPS), and Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS). In all scenarios, nuclear 
capacity is expected to increase [5]. Table 1 shows the current status of nuclear power 





Table 1. Nuclear Policy Status of Nuclear Power Operated Nations [6]. 
Country Policy and Status 
United States 
of America 
Increase of early closing power plant due to economic decline, and 
Federal and state-level nuclear support policy in progress. US 
nuclear power was 98.4 GWe, accounting for 20% of the total 
electric generation. 
France 
By 2035, nuclear power will be reduced from 75% (58 reactors in 
total, 63.2GWe total generating capacity) to 50%. 
China 
Nuclear power plants are increasing, and new nuclear power plants 
are under construction. The world's largest nuclear plant capacity 
will be acquired by 2030. Targeted nuclear power generation 
capacity of 58 GWe and new construction power generation 
capacity of 30 GWe by 2020. 48 reactors are operated (45.5 GWe). 
Japan 
In the Fifth Energy Basic Plan, nuclear power plants are referred to 
as important base load power sources. In 2030, the target ratio of 
nuclear power is 20 ~ 22%. 37 reactors are operated (35.9 GWe) 
Russia 
By 2030, plans to build 11 new reactors. Currently, six new reactors 
are under construction. A total of 36 reactors (28.4 GWe) are 
operated. 
Korea 
Construction of new nuclear power plants and prohibition of 
continued operation in accordance with energy conversion policy. 
25 reactors in operation. (23.8 GWe) 
Canada 
By 2033, Darlington and Bruce continued to operate the nuclear 
power plant through refurbishment. 19 units are in operation and the 
total power generation is 13.6 GWe. 
Ukraine 
Nuclear power will remain at 50% by 2035. 15 reactors are operated 
(13.6 GWe) 
Germany 
All nuclear power plants will be phased out by 2022. It currently 
operates 7 nuclear reactors (total generating capacity of 9.5 GWe). 
England 
Six new nuclear project plans. Currently, Hinkley Point C nuclear 
power plant is under construction. A total of 15 reactors are in 
operation (total generation capacity 8.9 GWe). 
Sweden 
Targeting 100% renewable energy by 2040. Ten new construction 
permits are allowed on existing nuclear sites. 8 nuclear power plants 
are in operation and supplying about 41.5% of electricity 
(generation capacity 8.6 GWe). 
Spain 
A total of seven reactors will be shut down between 2025 and 2035. 
7 nuclear reactors are in operation. It supplies about 21% of the total 
electricity demand (7.1 GWe total generating capacity). 
India 
Plans to build 21 new nuclear power plants by 2031. A total of 22 
reactors are in operation. (Generation capacity 6.3 GWe) 
Belgium 
Seven reactors will be phased out from 2022 to 2025. 7 nuclear 





Construction of new nuclear power plant is under way. The 
proportion of nuclear power plants in 2040 is forecast at 46 ~ 58%. 
6 reactors in operation. About 38% of total power (4 GWe). 
Taiwan 
Government promotes nuclear power phase-out. 4 reactors in 
operation. Approximately 15% of the total generating capacity (5.1 
GWe). 
Swiss 
Decision to shut down all nuclear power plants by 2034. 5 nuclear 
power plants are in operation. (3.5 GWe) 
Finland 
Construction of new nuclear power plant is under way. Plan for 
continuous use of nuclear power. 4 reactors in operation. About 
30% of the total power (2.8 GWe total generating capacity). 
Bulgaria 
The new nuclear power Belene project, which was withdrawn in 
2012, is being resumed. Kozloduy Power Plants 5 and 6 (VVER-
1000) were operated to produce 33% of the total power (total 
generation capacity 1.9 GWe). 
Hungary 
New nuclear power plants are being planned with a goal of 54% of 
nuclear power by 2030. 4 reactors supply approximately 50% of the 
total power (total generation capacity 1.9 GWe) 
Brazil 
Construction of Angra Unit 3 is suspended, and the government 
plans to complete the project using private investment. 2 reactors are 
in operation (1.9 GWe) 
South Africa 
By 2030, it plans to build a new nuclear power plant with a capacity 
of 9,600 MW, but recently withdrew. 2 reactors at Koeberg's 
nuclear power plant are in operation (1.9 GWe), providing 5% of the 
total power. 
Slovakia 
Two new reactors are under construction. The proportion of nuclear 
power plants in 2025 is forecast at 61%. 4 reactors are in operation 
(1.8 GWe) 
Argentina 
Research reactor under construction. Nuclear power will account for 
9% by 2025. 1 reactor is in operation (0.4 GWe) 
Mexico 
In September 2015, the Vice Minister of Energy announced the 
possibility of constructing two nuclear reactors at the existing site. 5 
reactors are in operation (1.6 GWe) 
Pakistan 
Plans to expand nuclear capacity to 8.8 GWe by 2035. 5 reactors are 
in operation (1.3 GWe). 
Romania 
Cernavoda 3,4unit under construction. 2 reactors are in operation 
(1.3 GWe). 
Iran 
Expanded capacity to 12,000MW by 2025. 1 reactor is in operation 
(0.9 GWe) 
Slovenian 
No plans to expand nuclear power. 1 reactor is in operation (0.7 
GWe) 
Netherlands 
Currently, there is no plan to construct new nuclear power plants. 1 
reactor is in operation (0.5 GWe) 
Armenia 
Nuclear power plant construction plan for replacement of old 




The capacity increase is the lowest in the CPS, and the expected increase in capacity is 
the highest in the SDS.  
- In the baseline scenario, the NPS, global nuclear capacity increased from 412 GW in 
2017 to 464 GW in 2030 and 518 GW in 2040, with an annual average capacity growth 
rate of 1% by 2040; 
- In the CPS, 459GW is expected in 2030 and 298GW in 2040, with an increase of 0.8%; 
- In the SDS scenario, 542 GW in 2030 and 678 GW in 2040 are expected, with an 
increase of 2.2%. 
As of 2019, 450 reactors were in operation in 30 countries around the world, with a total 





Figure 2. Operation reactors of all around the world in 2019 [7]. 
 
Table 2 shows the number of reactors in operation and power generation capacity in each 
country [7]. In addition, 57 reactors were under construction around the world, with a 
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2.2.1 Characteristics and advantages of SMRs  
 
The 2015 World Nuclear Association report described the characteristics and advantages 
of SMRs. These are classified into three categories as shown below: size characteristic, 
safety improvement, and cost efficiency [8].  
(1) Size characteristic:  
- Small size (less than 300 MWe) and modularity; SMRs could almost be 
completely built in a controlled factory setting and installed module by module, 
improving the level of construction quality and efficiency.  
- Modularity of fabrication (in-factory); which can also facilitate 
implementation of higher quality standards. 
(2) Safety improvement: 
- Passive safety features; can be lend them to countries with smaller grids and 
less experience of nuclear power. (No case yet) 
- Small power and compact architecture; less reliance on active safety systems 
and additional pumps, as well as AC power for accident mitigation. 
- Lower power; reduction of the source term as well as smaller radioactive 
inventory in a reactor (smaller reactors). 
- Underground or underwater location of the reactor; more protection from 
natural (e.g. seismic or tsunami according to the location) or man-made (e.g. 
aircraft impact) hazards. 
(3) Cost efficiency:  
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- Construction efficiency; can lead to easier financing compared to that for 
larger plants. 
- Economies of series production; for a specific SMR design will reduce costs 
further. 
- The modular design and small size lends itself to having multiple units on the 
same site. 
- Lower requirement for access to cooling water – therefore suitable for remote 
regions and for specific applications such as mining or desalination. 
- Ability to remove reactor module or in-situ decommissioning at the end of the 
lifetime. 
2.2.2 Goals of SMRs  
 
SMRs are currently being researched for commercial applications. SMRs are motivated 
by a variety of goals including improved safety, sustainability, efficiency, and cost. Eight 
technology goals have been defined for Generation IV reactors in four broad areas: 
sustainability, economics, safety and reliability, and proliferation resistance, and physical 
protection. The GIF defines the goals of the SMRs as follows [9]; 
(1) Sustainability; focus on fuel utilization and waste management. Sustainability 
requires the conservation of resources, protection of the environment, 
preservation of the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, and the 
avoidance of placing unjustified burdens upon them. The two sustainability 
goals encompass the interrelated needs of improved waste management, 
minimal environmental impacts, effective fuel utilization, and development of 
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new energy products that can expand the benefits of nuclear energy beyond 
electrical generation. 
- Goal 1: Generate energy sustainably and promote long-term availability of 
nuclear fuel. 
- Goal 2: Minimise nuclear waste and reduce the long term stewardship burden. 
(2) Safety and reliability; focus on safe and reliable operation, improved accident 
management and minimization of consequences, investment protection, and 
essentially eliminating the technical need for off-site emergency response. 
Safety and reliability are essential priorities in the development and operation 
of nuclear energy systems. Generation IV systems have goals to achieve high 
levels of safety and reliability through further improvements. The three safety 
and reliability goals continue the past trend and seek simplified designs that are 
safe and further reduce the potential for severe accidents and minimize their 
consequences. The achievement of these ambitious goals cannot rely only upon 
technical improvements, but will also require systematic consideration of 
human performance as a major contributor to the plant availability, reliability, 
inspectability, and maintainability. 
- Goal 3: Excel in safety and reliability. 
- Goal 4: Have a very low likelihood and degree of reactor core damage.  
- Goal 5: Eliminate the need for offsite emergency response. 
Table 3 shows the expected Core Damage Frequency (CDF) of several SMRs [10]. Some 
SMRs are not CDF capable or not considered, and SMRs such as AHWR-300, IRIS, 
NuScale, mPower, KLT-40S, 4S and SVBR-100 have a Core Damage Frequency of 10-8. 
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Table 3. Core Damage Frequencies of various types of SMRs [10]. 
 
SMRs Core Damage Frequency
CAREM (CNEA, Argentina) <10
-7
ACP100 (CNNC, China) <10
-6
CAP150 (SNERDI/SNPTC, China) <10
-7
CAP200 (SNERDI/SNPTC, China) <10
-6
AHWR-300 (BARC, India) <10
-8
IRIS (IRIS International Consortium) <10
-8
DMS (Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Japan) <5.0x10
-8
IMR (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Japan) <2.9x10
-7
SMART (KAERI, Republic of Korea) <2.0x10
-7
(internal events)
UNITHERM (NIKIET, Russian Federation) <10
-6
KARAT-45 (NIKIET, Russian Federation) <10
-6
KARAT-100 (NIKIET, Russian Federation) <10
-6
ELENA (Kurchatov Institute, Russian Federation) -
RUTA-70 (NIKIET, Russian Federation) PSA is not completed, assessment < 10-6
NuScale (NuScale Power Inc., United States of America) <10
-8
(internal events)
mPower (BWX Technologies, Inc., United States of America) <10
-8
Westinghouse SMR (Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC., United States of America) <5.0x10
-8
SMR-160 (Holtec International, United States of America) <10
-6
ACPR50S (CGN, China) <10
-6
Flexblue (DCNS, France) <10
-7
KLT-40S (OKBM Afrikantov, Russian Federation) <5x10
-8
RITM-200 (OKBM Afrikantov, Russian Federation) <9x10
-7
VBER-300 (OKBM Afrikantov, Russian Federation) <10
-6
ABV-6E (OKBM Afrikantov, Russian Federation) <10
-6
SHELF (NIKIET, Russian Federation) -
HTR-PM (Tsinghua University, China) 
Core damage frequency not applicable to HTGRs.
No off-site shelter or evacuation plan needed.
GTHTR300 (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan) <10
-8
GT-MHR (OKBM Afrikantov, Russian Federation) 
Core damage frequency not applicable to HTGRs.
BDBA frequency < 1E-5 /year.
Frequency of ultimate release at BDBA < 1 E-7 /year
MHR-T reactor/Hydrogen production complex (OKBM Afrikantov, Russian Federation)
Core damage frequency not applicable to HTGRs.
BDBA frequency <1E-5/year.
Frequency of ultimate release at BDBA <1E-7 /year.
MHR-100 (OKBM Afrikantov, Russian Federation)
Core damage frequency not applicable to HTGRs.
BDBA frequency <1E-5/year.
Frequency of ultimate release at BDBA <1E-7 /year.
PBMR-400 (Pebble Bed Modular Reactor SOC Ltd., South Africa) 
Core damage frequency not applicable to HTGRs.
No off-site shelter or evacuation.
HTMR-100 SMR (Steenkampskraal Thorium Limited (STL), South Africa 
Slight damage with water ingress event with design base
frequency.< 1E-4 /year
SC-HTGR (AREVA NP, USA) -
Xe-100 (X-energy, United States of America) No core melt possible
LEADIR-PS (Northern Nuclear Industries Incorporated, Canada) -
4S (Toshiba Corporation, Japan) <1.7x10
-8
BREST-OD-300 (NIKIET, Russian Federation) -
SVBR-100 (JSC AKME Engineering, Russian Federation) <10
-8
G4M (Gen4 Energy Inc., United States of America) -
EM
2
 (General Atomics, United States of America) -
Integral Molten Salt Reactor (Terrestrial Energy, Canada) Not applicable
MSTW (Seaborg Technologies, Denmark)
ThorCon (Martingale, International Consortium) -
FUJI (International Thorium Molten-Salt Forum, Japan) Core meltdown is impossible
Stable Salt Reactor (Moltex Energy, United Kingdom) <10
-6
SmAHTR (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, United States of America)
Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor (Flibe Energy, United States of America) Not applicable
Mk1 PB-FHR (UC Berkeley, United States) -
WATER COOLED SMALL MODULAR REACTORS (LAND BASED)
HIGH TEMPERATURE GAS COOLED SMALL MODULAR REACTORS
WATER COOLED SMALL MODULAR REACTORS (MARINE BASED)
MOLTEN SALT SMALL MODULAR REACTORS
FAST NEUTRON SPECTRUM SMALL MODULAR REACTORS
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(3) Economics; focus on competitive life cycle and energy production costs and 
financial risk. Economic competitiveness is a requirement of the marketplace 
and is essential for Generation IV nuclear energy systems. While it is 
anticipated that Generation IV nuclear energy systems will primarily produce 
electricity, they will also help meet anticipated future needs for a broader range 
of energy products beyond electricity. For example, hydrogen, process heat, 
district heating, and potable water will likely be needed to keep up with 
increasing worldwide demands and long-term changes in energy use. 
Generation IV systems have goals to ensure that they are economically 
attractive while meeting changing energy needs. 
- Goal 6: Have a life cycle cost advantage over other energy sources. 
- Goal 7: Have a level of financial risk comparable to other energy projects. 
(4) Proliferation resistance and physical protection; focuses on controlling and 
securing nuclear material and nuclear facilities. Proliferation resistance and 
physical protection are also essential priorities in the expanding role of nuclear 
energy systems. This goal applies to all inventories of nuclear materials in the 
system involved in enrichment, conversion, fabrication, power production, 
recycling, and waste disposal. In addition, existing nuclear plants are highly 
secure and designed to withstand external events such as earthquakes, floods, 
tornadoes, plane crashes, and fires. Their many protective features considerably 
reduce the impact of external or internal threats through the redundancy, 
diversity, and independence of the safety systems. This goal points out the need 
to increase public confidence in the security of nuclear energy facilities against 
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terrorist attacks. Advanced systems need to be designed from the start with 
improved physical protection against acts of terrorism, to a level commensurate 
with the protection of other critical systems and infrastructure. 
- Goal 8: Be a very unattractive route for diversion or theft of weapon-usable 
materials, and provide increased physical protection against acts of terrorism. 
The goal of SMRs are summarized as follows; 
- Generate energy sustainably and promote long-term availability of nuclear fuel. 
- Minimise nuclear waste and reduce the long term stewardship burden. 
- Excel in safety and reliability. 
- Have a very low likelihood and degree of reactor core damage.  
- Eliminate the need for offsite emergency response. 
- Have a life cycle cost advantage over other energy sources. 
- Have a level of financial risk comparable to other energy projects. 
- Be a very unattractive route for diversion or theft of weapon-usable materials, and 
provide increased physical protection against acts of terrorism. 
2.2.3 Six representative types of SMRs  
 
To achieve the goals of SMRs, GIF selected six new concept reactors [11]: 
(1) Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR); The GFR system is a high-temperature helium-
cooled fast-spectrum reactor with a closed fuel cycle. It combines the 
advantages of fast-spectrum systems for long-term sustainability of uranium 
resources and waste minimization, with those of high-temperature systems. The 
GFR cooled by helium is proposed as a longer-term alternative to sodium-
cooled fast reactors. The helium coolant is a single-phase coolant that is 
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chemically inert, which does not dissociate or become activated, is transparent 
and while the coolant void coefficient is still positive, it is small and dominated 
by Doppler feedback. The reactor core has a relatively high power density, 
offering the advantages of improved inspection and simplified coolant handling. 
The high core outlet temperature above 750 °C, typically 800-850 °C is an 
added value to the closed fuel cycle. 
(2) Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR); The LFRs feature a fast neutron spectrum, 
high temperature operation, and cooling by either molten lead or Lead-Bismuth 
Eutectic (LBE), both of which support low-pressure operation, have very good 
thermodynamic properties, and are relatively inert with regard to interaction 
with air or water. An important feature of the LFR is the enhanced safety that 
results from the choice of a relatively inert coolant. Also, it would have 
multiple applications including production of electricity, hydrogen, and process 
heat. The LFR is an advanced Gen IV reactor type that offers significant 
advantages in achieving the goals set by GIF. Among the 6 reactor types 
considered to be promising by the GIF, the LFR may well offer the best 
combination of characteristics and advantages. 
(3) Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR); The SFR uses liquid sodium as the reactor 
coolant, allowing high power density with low coolant volume fraction and 
operation at low pressure. The SFR can reduce the radiotoxicity and heat load 
which facilitates waste disposal and geologic isolation, and enhanced utilization 




(4) Molten Salt Reactor (MSR); The MSR is a reactor type that uses molten salt as 
the primary cooling system. Molten salts have low vapour pressure and high 
stability, lower reactivity than liquid sodium, and high thermal efficiency. 
Because the MSR does not use fuel assemblies, it has features of simplified 
reactor structure and uniform combustion rate, and can be reprocessed while the 
reactor is operating. 
(5) Very High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (VHTR); The VHTR is primarily 
dedicated to the cogeneration of electricity and hydrogen, the latter being 
extracted from water by using thermo-chemical, electro-chemical or hybrid 
processes. The VHTR has potential for inherent safety, high thermal efficiency, 
process heat application capability, low operation and maintenance costs, and 
modular construction. 
(6) Super Critical Water-cooled Reactor (SCWR); The SCWRs are high 
temperature, high-pressure, light-water-cooled reactors that operate above the 
thermodynamic critical point of water (374 °C, 22.1 MPa). The SCWRs can 
increase in thermal efficiency, remove reactor coolant pumps and steam 
separators and dryers, reduce containment and steam turbine size. These general 
features offer the potential of lower capital costs for a given electric power of 
the plant and of better fuel utilization, and thus a clear economic advantage. 
However, at this stage, this type of SMRs has not been developed yet. 
Table 4 shows the six representative types of SMRs [12]. 
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Table 4. Characteristics according to typical design type of SMRs [12]. 
 
 
Table 5 shows the summary of main design features and status of SMRs from the 2018 
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Table 5. Summary of main design features and status of SMRs [13]. 
 
 
Design Output MW(e) Type Designers Country Status
CAREM 30 PWR CNEA Argentina Under construction
ACP100 100 PWR CNNC China Basic Design
CAP200 150/200 PWR CGNPC China Conceptual Design
DHR400 (District Heating) LWR(pool type) CNNC China Basic Design
IRIS 335 PWR IRIS Consortium Multiple Countries Conceptual Design
DMS 300 BWR Hitachi GE Japan Basic Design
IMR 350 PWR MHI Japan Conceptual Design
SMART 100 PWR KAERI Republic of Korea Certified Design
ELENA 68 kW(e) PWR National Research Centre “Kurchatov Institute” Russian Federation Conceptual Design
KARAT-45/100 45/100 BWR NIKIET Russian Federation Conceptual Design
RITM-200 50 × 2 PWR OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation Under Development
RUTA-70 70 MW(t) PWR NIKIET Russian Federation Conceptual Design
UNITHERM 6.6 PWR NIKIET Russian Federation Conceptual Design
VK-300 250 BWR NIKIET Russian Federation Detailed Design
UK-SMR 443 PWR Rolls-Royce and Partners United Kingdom Mature Concept
mPower 195 × 2 PWR BWX Technologies USA Under Development
NuScale 50 × 12 PWR NuScale Power USA Under Development
SMR-160 160 PWR Holtec International USA Preliminary Design
W-SMR 225 PWR Westinghouse USA Conceptual Design
ACPR50S 60 PWR CGNPC China Preliminary Design
ABV-6E 6~9 Floating PWR OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation Final design
KLT-40S 70 Floating PWR OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation Under construction
RITM-200M 50 × 2 Floating PWR OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation Under Development
SHELF 6.4 Immersed NPP NIKIET Russian Federation Detailed Design
VBER-300 325 Floating PWR OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation Licensing Stage
HTR-PM 210 HTGR INET, Tsinghua University China Under Construction
GTHTR300 300 HTGR JAEA Japan Basic Design
GT-MHR 285 HTGR OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation Preliminary Design
MHR-T 205.5х4 HTGR OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation Conceptual Design
MHR-100 25 – 87 HTGR OKBM Afrikantov Russian Federation Conceptual Design
A-HTR-100 50 HTGR Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. South Africa Conceptual Design
HTMR-100 35 HTGR Steenkampskraal Thorium Limited South Africa Conceptual Design
PBMR-400 165 HTGR PBMR SOC Ltd South Africa Preliminary Design
SC-HTGR 272 HTGR AREVA USA Conceptual Design
Xe-100 35 HTGR X-energy LLC USA Conceptual Design
4S 10 LMFR Toshiba Corporation Japan Detailed Design
LFR-AS-200 200 LMFR Hydromine Nuclear Energy Luxembourg Preliminary Design
LFR-TL-X 5~20 LMFR Hydromine Nuclear Energy Luxembourg Conceptual Design
BREST-OD-300 300 LMFR NIKIET Russian Federation Detailed Design
SVBR-100 100 LMFR JSC AKME Engineering Russian Federation Detailed Design
SEALER 3 Small Lead Cooled LeadCold Sweden Conceptual Design
EM2 265 GMFR General Atomics USA Conceptual Design
SUPERSTAR 120 LMFR Argonne National Laboratory USA Conceptual Design
WLFR 450 LFR Westinghouse USA Conceptual Design
IMSR 190 MSR Terrestrial Energy Canada Basic Design
CMSR 100-115 MSR Seaborg Technologies Denmark Conceptual Design
CA Waste Burner 20 MSR Copenhagen Atomics Denmark Conceptual Design
ThorCon 250 MSR Martingale International Consortium Basic Design
FUJI 200 MSR International Thorium Molten-Salt Forum: ITMSF Japan Experimental Phase
Stable Salt Reactor 37.5×8 MSR Moltex Energy United Kingdom Conceptual Design
Stable Salt Reactor 300~900 MSR Moltex Energy United Kingdom Pre-Conceptual Design
LFTR 250 MSR Flibe Energy USA Conceptual Design
Mk1 PB-FHR 100 MSR University of California, Berkeley USA Pre-Conceptual Design
MCSFR 50 MSR Elysium Industries USA and Canada Conceptual Design
eVinci 0.2~15 Small Heat Pipe Westinghouse USA Under Development
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Figure 3 shows a histogram of the SMRs listed in Table 5 over a range of power 
generation capacities. The largest number of reactors with an output below 50 MWe was 
14. The number of reactors with outputs of 50 to 100 MWe was 12, and the number of 
reactors with high outputs above 250 MWe accounted for 16. 
 
2.3 Review of characteristic of SMRs 
Due to the characteristics of SMRs, regulatory guidelines applied to existing large nuclear 
power plants may have to be revised or reset. To establish the appropriate regulatory 
guidelines for SMRs, it is necessary to correctly understand the characteristics of SMRs. 
For this purpose, the characteristics of SMRs are classified and explored into four 
categories: fully passive safety system; multi-unit modular reactor; underground 
construction of containment buildings; design of nuclear reactor internalization and 
integration. The exploration of the characteristics of SMRs in this Chapter includes 
design, manufacturing, and construction. Table 6 shows whether some SMRs are 





Figure 3. Summary of SMRs design based on power range [13]. 
  
Table 6. Evaluation of some SMRs in four categories. 
 
 
2.3.1 Fully Passive Safety System 
 
SMRs, represented by Generation IV reactors, have significantly lower accident 
consequences than conventional large reactors due to their size and unique design 
characteristics. This is because the Engineered Safety Features of the SMRs are designed 










CAREM Yes Yes No Yes
IRIS Yes Yes No Yes
SMART No Yes No Yes
mPower No Yes Yes Yes
NuScale Yes Yes Yes Yes
KLT-40S No Yes No Yes
HTR-PM No Yes No No
4S No Yes No No
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The integrated reactors of Light Water Reactor (LWR) type SMRs, such as NuScale, 
which is expected to be commercially available soon [14], are designed so that the Large 
Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) does not fundamentally occur. In addition, 
the reactor coolant, which has a lower density due to the heat from the fuel, transfers heat 
to the steam generator and increases in density and spontaneously circulates. Cooling by 
natural convection of the reactor coolant is designed to eliminate the need for a separate 
device for forced flow. In the case of other LWR-type SMRs, the reactor coolant pump is 
designed as a canned-pump type to prevent leakage of the reactor coolant. Furthermore, 
the reactor is designed to be immersed in a large reactor pool. The reactor pool fulfills the 
role of a refueling water storage tank, and is considered as a final heat removal source. 
For example, NuScale has a reservoir capable of storing 30.3 million Liter (8 million 
gallons) of cooling water, which acts as a final heat removal source to cool the reactor 
core in a natural circulation manner during normal and emergency cooling operations. 
Therefore, even in Station Black-Out (SBO) situations, it is designed to enable safe shut-
down and self cooling of the core without the action of an operator [15]. Figure 4 shows 
the NuScale reactor. The left side of the figure shows the schematic of the integrated 




Figure 4. NuScale Small Modular Reactor [15]. 
 
Assuming that all safety engineered features failed due to the occurrence of severe 
accidents, the mission time of the reactor pool (the ultimate heat sink for the removal of 
decay heat) was calculated: 
45 MWe (160 MWth) fuel power : 3.15 MWe decay power 
The time to boil 30.3 million liters = 53,866 minutes 
The time required to boil 30.3 million liters of water is about 897 hour (37.4 day). This 
time is considered to be enough time to refill the pool. 
In the case of the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) with a fully passive safety 
system, the VHTR transfers the residual heat from the nuclear fuel to the reactor vessel in 
case of an accident, and then to the Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS) as the 
passive safety device as shown in Figure 5. Then, the heated, lighter air inside the device 
is discharged to the outside through the upper "natural circulation riser", the chimney. 
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The natural circulation process in which the cold air in the outside is sucked into the 
space where the heated air escapes, and is again heated and discharged is repeated. As the 
inside of the containment vessel is cooled with air, even if the vessel is broken, the air can 
cool the reactor better. It is designed to cool the reactor with natural phenomena such as 
thermal conduction and radiative cooling of the reactor. VHTRs are also designed to 
eliminate the need for separate cooling units used in existing reactors. VHTRs are less 
likely to leak radioactive material and cool down naturally with air. Also, the explosion 
does not occur at the origin. Figure 5 shows an example of a recent VHTR design 
submitted to the Senior Industry Advisory Panel (SIAP) [16].  
In the case of Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs), Since the graphite used as a moderator has a 
good thermal conductivity, if the reactor fails and the chain reaction stops, the remaining 
 
 




heat is easily conducted out of the reactor. It is designed to prevent leakage of radioactive 
material by cooling the reactor vessel automatically without any external power source or 
operator action.  
2.3.2 Multi-Unit Modular Reactor 
 
With a fully passive safety system design, one of the most distinctive features of SMRs is 
a modular design, construction, and operation. Multi-unit modular reactor design is the 
concept of constructing and deploying a nuclear power plant using standardized reactor 
modules defined by modularity. The modularity refers to a module at the reactor level, 
not a module at the part level. The modularity of SMRs means "Plug and Play" level of 
modularization with minimal work on the construction site of the plant. This is 
characterized in that the generation capacity can be set by determining the number of 
modules according to the demanded power amount of the power generation company. 
Furthermore, in the case of an area where power demand is gradually increasing, it is 
possible to increase the generation capacity by adding modules within the same site 
already constructed. The US Department of Energy (DOE) defines the modularity of 
SMRs as follows [17]: 
The term “modular” in the context of SMRs refers to the ability to fabricate 
major components of the nuclear steam supply system in a factory environment 
and ship to the point of use.  Even though current large nuclear power plants 
incorporate factory-fabricated components (or modules) into their designs, a 
substantial amount of field work is still required to assemble components into 
an operational power plant. SMRs are envisioned to require limited on-site 
preparation and substantially reduce the lengthy construction times that are 
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typical of the larger units. SMRs provide simplicity of design, enhanced safety 
features, the economics and quality afforded by factory production, and more 
flexibility (financing, siting, sizing, and end-use applications) compared to 
larger nuclear power plants. Additional modules can be added incrementally as 
demand for energy increases. 
If additional reactor modules are installed in an already built or operating SMRs nuclear 
facility, this has the advantage of reducing expenses such as site survey, securing 
ownership, construction of transmission and distribution network, etc. at the initial stage 
of construction because it uses pre-secured site. Also, unlike conventional large power 
plants that have to shut down all the power plants for maintenance, modular reactors 
maximize facility utilization by stopping individual modular reactors that require 
maintenance and sequential maintenance. As can be seen in Table 6, SMRs of modular 
design are currently IRIS, SMART, mPower, NuScale, KLT-40S, HTR-PM and 4S. 
Figure 6 shows the installation of three NuScale SMRs as an example of a multi-unit 





Figure 6. An example of a Multi-unit modular nuclear power plant layout [18]. 
 
2.3.3 Underground construction of containment buildings 
 
The size and thickness of containment buildings in existing large nuclear power plants are 
determined by taking into account the maximum pressure and temperature caused by the 
release of all pressurized water from the primary cooling system to the steam in the event 
of a severe accident such as a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA). The function of the 
containment building is to prevent external leakage of radioactive material during design 
basis accidents and to maintain safety. It also protects internal facilities not only during 
severe accidents but also during accidents such as earthquakes, aircraft crashes, and 
terrorist attacks. 
If nuclear power plants are constructed underground, the characteristics of SMRs such as 
passive safety features, small integral reactor, and underground construction, are 
prominent compared to existing nuclear power plants. According to report by Pinto [19], 
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construction of existing large nuclear power plants underground is expected to increase 
construction costs by more than 30% compared to building on the ground due to scale 
problems. However, in the case of SMRs, which have advantages such as reduced costs 
due to the small size of the nuclear power plant and reduced construction costs due to the 
modularization of the reactor, it is clear that this rise in construction costs will be 
significantly reduced. 
If the nuclear power plant is underground, the ground can replace the role of the 
containment building, and safety can be greatly increased. The possibility of external 
leakage of radioactive material, which can be caused by internal high-temperature high 
pressure due to a severe accident or unexpected external load, will be greatly reduced. As 
a result, it is possible to achieve a high level of containment effect and to improve the 
safety of the nuclear power plant. 
In addition, the restrictions on the construction sites of nuclear power plants can be 
drastically reduced. The multiple barriers for the internal sealing of radioactive materials 
make the construction of nuclear power plants very restrictive in siting, design and 
licensing of nuclear power plants. For example, it is expected that the regulations on the 
impacts of the people around the nuclear power plant and the surrounding environment, 
meteorological, and hydrological impact assessment can be greatly simplified. The 
existing large-scale nuclear power plants were constructed to avoid population centers, 
but the underground construction of nuclear facilities made it possible to build the SMRs 
nuclear facilities near the city. In addition, the earthquake, meteorological and 
hydrological characteristics of the region where nuclear power plants are to be 
constructed are very important factors for site selection of nuclear power plants. 
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However, the underground construction of nuclear facilities allows them to be very free 
from factors that threaten the safety of nuclear power plants, disasters such as 
earthquakes, tornadoes or aircraft crashes. 
Secondly, it is expected to improve the seismic safety of nuclear power plants. According 
to Earthquake engineering of large underground structures, the general view is that 
underground structures are much less severely affected by strong seismic motion than 
surface structures [20]. In the case of ground structures, when the mass of structure is 
large or the ground stiffness is relatively small compared to the structure, when the 
earthquake occurs, the inertial force of the structure greatly affects the seismic response 
of the ground structure. However, in the case of underground structures due to earthquake 
effects, the surrounding medium is almost the same behavior as the surrounding ground 
rather than different behaviours. As a result, the underground structure shows an 
improvement in seismic safety because it does not show a large amplification 
phenomenon in the seismic response as compared with the ground structure [21].  
Finally, the most significant advantage of underground nuclear power plants is that 
nuclear power plants can be constructed and operated at close proximity to the power 
demand reducing transmission related costs. These benefits are another key to the 
flexibility of site selection for SMRs. 
On the other hand, what can be considered as a disadvantage of underground nuclear 
power plants is expected to be a decrease in accessibility. However, the minimum 
accessibility to mitigate accidents in the event of an accident is expected to be designed 
with due consideration, and it seems that this will not be a problem. As shown in Table 6, 





Figure 7. Conceptual drawing of an underground containment structure (B&W 
mPower) [22]. 
 
and NuScale only. Figure 7 shows a conceptual drawing of an underground containment 
structure housing two B&W mPower reactor modules [22]. 
 
2.3.4 Design of nuclear reactor internalization and integration 
 
As has been shown, the most important design feature of SMRs is that they are designed 
to be located inside the reactor to pursue an integral reactor. Conventional large-scale 
nuclear power plants consisted of core apparatuses or systems such as steam generators, 
control rod drives, and reactor coolant pumps connected or attached to the reactor 
independently by pipelines. In the case of a coolant pump, which is essential for the 
coolant flow of existing large nuclear power plants, the design of SMRs is designed to 
apply passive principles such as natural convection or gravity, or to attach pipes directly 
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to the reactor vessel to avoid piping. Also, the steam generator is designed to be located 
inside the reactor vessel, and it is designed not to require piping from the reactor to the 
steam generator. Therefore, it is believed that the absence of such large-scale piping of 
the existing nuclear power plant causing LOCA in case of an accident greatly increased 






Chapter 3. Methodology  
The purpose of this report is to define the key changes necessary in nuclear regulatory 
standards to address issues raised by SMRs. To capture all changes necessary would be 
an exhaustive task and in some cases premature. It is better instead to concentrate on 
regulations that can help with the initial design process to improve the concepts before 
they become finalized. 
To achieve this goal, a 5 step process is followed as shown in Figure 8. The first step 
consists of reviewing the current status of all SMRs. The second step is to review current 
regulations.  The third step is to develop a set of criteria to adequately judge the current 
regulations. The fourth step is to perform the assessment and identify gaps and the fifth 
step is to recommend changes to key regulations. Figure 8 shows a flowchart for deriving 
appropriate regulatory standards for SMRs through literature review. 
 




To this end, a literature review was performed regarding SMR features as discussed in 
Chapter 2. First, the characteristics of the design aspects and the literature related to 
research and development are reviewed and investigated to characterize the SMRs. The 
SMRs features are devided into 4 categories that are significantly different from current 
plants: implementation of passive safety features; modularity; underground construction; 
and system integration. The literature review will consider these categories in comparison 
to the reactor types and identify the relevant features that need to be considered. A review 
of the literature on the design characteristics of SMRs was conducted using reports issued 
by the World Nuclear Association (WNA) [23], information published by the 
manufacturer, and R & D results and forecast reports issued by the Generation IV 
Information Forum (GIF). 
For step 2, in order to establish the regulatory standards, several sources are considered.  
The USNRC's regulatory standards (listed in Table 7), and the safety series report of the 
IAEA (listed in Table 9) were reviewed as foundational as they are the source documents 
most other countries base their standards and regulations on.  Additional review of 
Canadian standards and regulations and research papers were also reviewed.  In this 
review, a line by line assessment is considered too comprehensive and has the potential to 
get buried in detail.  In essence, the review was to identify the crucial key concerns such 
as Control, Cool, and Contain that are fundamental to nuclear plant design.  Note that as 
the number of standards to be reviewed is large, this step will also consider the key 




Table 7 USNRC 10 CFR part for the regulation 
 
Table 8. Configuration of Regulatory Guide. 
               
 




Part 20 Standards for protection against radiation
Part 50 Domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities
Part 51 Environmental protection regulations for domestic licensing and related regulatory functions
Part 52 Licenses, certifications, and approvals for nuclear power plants
Part 73 Physical protection of plants and materials
Part 100 Reactor site criteria
No. Title
1 Power Reactors
2 Research and Test Reactors
3 Fuels and Materials Facilities
4 Environmental and Siting




9 Antitrust and Financial Review
10 General
Categories
Safety Fundamentals SF-1 Fundamental Safety Principles
GSR Part 1 Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety
GSR Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety
GSR Part 3 Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources
GSR Part 4 Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities
GSR Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste (2009)
GSR Part 6 Decommissioning and Termination of Activities
GSR Part 7 Emergency Preparedness and Response
SSR-1 Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations
SSR-2/1 Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design
SSR-2/2 Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation
SSR-3 Safety of Research Reactors
SSR-4 Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
SSR-5 Disposal of Radioactive Waste (2011)






For the USNRC, the main guidelines for the regulation of nuclear facilities are listed in 
the following table. 
In addition, the regulatory guide provides guidance on licensing nuclear facilities, 
combining interpretations and opinions when the USNRC makes specific regulations in 
accordance with the guidelines. The composition of the Regulatory Guide is shown in the 
following table. Regulatory guides are issued in the following 10 broad divisions: 
Each guide is identified by a number composed of the regulatory guide designator, 
followed by a division number, a period, and a sequential guide number. 
Upon completion of the first two steps, a view of SMR concepts and current regulatory 
approaches can be considered. Criteria is established that links fundamental guidance to 
the reactor designs. These criteria will be set such that failure to achieve them would 
render one of the SMR design features unsuccessful. Then for step 4, the current 
regulations can be reviewed again to see if they contain the specific requirements 
established in the criteria phase and further if sufficient detail is available in the current 
standards and regulations.  Then a judgement on whether or not the reviewed regulatory 
standards matched the characteristics of the SMRs can be achieved. The results of the 
literature review are used to establish the regulatory standards that should be applied to 
SMRs. 
The first step is the exploration phase of the characteristics and development status of 
SMRs and the significant differences between existing large-scale nuclear power plants 
and SMRs, as described in Chapter 2 of this report. The second and third stage is 




Chapter 4. Review of current safety regulatory standards 
The principles for the safety of nuclear power plants can be found in the safety series 
published by the IAEA and in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which 
are covered by the USNRC as listed in Table 7 and 8 (See previous chapter). While other 
codes and standards will be considered, these two are fundamental to this work. The set 
of Safety Standards of the IAEA includes a unified Safety Fundamentals (SF1), a General 
Safety Requirements (GSR) in seven parts applicable to all facilities and activities with a 
graded approach, complemented by a set of six facilities and activities Specific Safety 
Requirements (SSRs). The Safety Requirements are implemented through a set of general 
and specific safety guides. Table 9 listed the standards according to the hierarchy of the 
IAEA safety series [24]. 
Section 4.1 will discuss IAEA documents while section 4.2 will discuss USNRC 
documents, and Section 4.3 will discuss siting. Section 4.4 will discuss operations. 
Section 4.5 is a summary, and Section 4.6 will identify key criteria.  
4.1 Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants 
First, the IAEA INSAG-3 (1988) systematically presented the safety goals of nuclear 
power plants and the various principles of safety to achieve them [25]. It was revised to 
INSAG-12 (1999) in 1999 [26]. INSAG-3 / INSAG-12 presents basic safety principles 
systematically by dividing them into operational responsibilities, defense in depth 
strategies, and general technical principles.  
4.1.1 Operational Responsibility  
 
Operational Responsibility emphasizes three aspects: Safety Culture, Operational 
Organization Responsibility, and Regulation and Independence Verification. 
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(1) Safety culture: An established safety culture governs the behaviour and 
interactions of individuals and organizations engaged in nuclear-related 
activities. This is important to ensure the plant has the proper mindset when 
problems occur. Safety culture strengthens the defense in depth. 
(2) Operational Organization Responsibility: The ultimate responsibility for a 
nuclear plant safety rests with the operating organization. It cannot be diluted 
by separate activities or responsibilities of designers, equipment suppliers, 
constructors, or regulators. This aspect requires the owner of the plant to be 
responsible and ensure all workers on site, including contractors and sub-
contractors, conduct work in a safe manner. 
(3) Regulation and Independence Verification: The Government establishes a legal 
framework for the nuclear industry and establishes an independent regulatory 
organization that will enforce nuclear power licensing and regulation. The 
responsibility of the regulatory organization is clearly separated from that of 
other organizations, ensuring that the regulator is independent of the safety 
responsible body and protected from undue pressure. As part of this aspect, it is 
necessary for the regulator to have certain expertise with respect to the safe 
operation of the plant as design. Note that no information is provided to a 
specific design regardless of size or type. 
4.1.2 Defense-in-Depth Strategy  
 
The Defense-in-Depth strategy is one of the most important principle of the technical 
aspect for nuclear safety. To compensate for possible human errors and mechanical 
failures, the concept of defense in depth with multi-level protection, including continuous 
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barriers (Multiple Barrier) to prevent environmental leakage of radioactive materials, is 
implemented. This concept includes measures to protect the barriers by preventing 
damage to the power plants and the barriers themselves and to protect the public and the 
environment from disasters even if the barriers are not fully effective. Figure 9 shows the 
concept of defense-in-depth. 
The intent shown in Figure 9 is to ensure the fission products or radioactive material is 
retained in the fuel and does not reach the surrounding environment. The fuel is designed 
to keep the material in solid form. This represents the first barrier. The second barrier is 
the cladding. The material is chosen such that it stops gases from easily escaping. The 
third barrier material is the pressure boundary of the coolant system. The fourth barrier is 
 
 




a steel plate on the inner side of the containment building. The final barrier is reinforced 
concrete. 
The strategy for defence-in-depth is twofold: first, to prevent accidents and second, if 
prevention fails, to limit the potential consequences of an accident and to prevent its 
evolution to more serious conditions. Defence-in-Depth is generally structured in five 
levels. The objectives of each level of protection and the essential means of achieving 
them in existing plants are shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Levels of Defence-in-Depth in existing plants [26]. 
 
(1) Accident Prevention: The first priority is to ensure safety, i.e. prevention of 
accidents (especially accidents that can cause severe core damage). 
(2) Accident Mitigation: On-site and off-site mitigation measures are in place to 
significantly reduce the effects of radiation leakage in the event of a severe 
accident. 
Note that no information is provided to a specific design. 




Conservative design and high quality
in construction and operation
Level 2
Control of abnormal operation
and detection of failures
Control, limiting and protection systems
and other surveillance features
Level 3 Control of accidents within the design basis
Engineered safety features and
accident procedures
Level 4
Control of severe plant conditions,
including prevention of accident progression




Mitigation of radiological consequences




4.1.3 General Technical Principles and Specific Principles  
 
The safety objectives and the fundamental principles provide a conceptual framework for 
the specific safety principles. The specific principles are presented as follows: 
(1) Siting: The selection of an appropriate site is an important process since local 
circumstances can affect safety. The choice of site takes into account the results 
of investigations of local factors that could adversely affect the safety of the 
plant. Local factors include natural factors and human made hazards. Natural 
factors to be considered include geological and seismological characteristics 
and the potential for hydrological and meteorological disturbances. Human 
made hazards include those arising from chemical installations, the release of 
toxic and flammable gases, and aircraft impact. 
(2) Design: The design of a nuclear power plant ensures that the components, 
systems and structures of the plant have the appropriate characteristics, 
specifications and material composition, and are combined and laid out in such 
a way as to meet the general plant performance specifications. Most aspects of 
safety design are achieving nuclear plant safety objectives by achieving reactor 
power control, fuel cooling, and the confinement of radioactive materials by 
appropriate physical obstructions. To this end, normal operation and anticipated 
operational occurrences are controlled so that plant and system variables remain 
within their operating ranges. In addition, in a solid fuel reactor, almost all the 
radioactive materials are confined in fuel pellets sealed within an impervious 
barrier, usually metallic fuel cladding. Nuclear safety is ensured for these 
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reactors if the radioactive materials are kept inside the fuel and within other 
barriers provided by the design. 
(3) Manufacturing and Construction: The operating organization and the regulatory 
organization carry out construction of a nuclear power plant only after 
appropriate evaluation of the major safety issues have been satisfactorily 
resolved. At approximately the stage when preliminary design has been 
completed a safety analysis is performed. This overall analysis is reviewed with 
the regulatory authorities to ensure that regulatory requirements have been met 
or will be met, and the plant will be safe for operation. The plant manufacturers 
and constructors discharge their responsibilities for the provision of equipment 
and construction of high quality by using well proven and established 
techniques and procedures supported by quality assurance practices. The 
manufacturer establishes procedures for the control of processes and 
documents; identification and control of materials and components; setting of 
inspection and test schedules; maintenance of records, hold points and 
corrective procedures for deviations; the whole being subject to a hierarchy of 
quality assurance practices. 
(4) Commissioning: The commissioning programme is established and followed to 
demonstrate that the entire plant, especially items critical to safety and radiation 
protection, have been constructed and function according to the design intent, 
and to ensure that weaknesses are detected and corrected. To ensure that the 
design intent has been met, the commissioning programme includes checks of 
safety equipment and its functional characteristics, and of provisions for 
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radiation protection. Where complete tests of components and systems under 
realistic conditions cannot be made, tests are performed in combination under 
conditions as close as possible to realistic. Procedures for normal plant and 
systems operation and for functional tests to be performed during the operating 
phase are validated as part of the commissioning programme. During the 
commissioning programme, the as-built operating characteristics of safety and 
process systems are determined and documented. Operating points are adjusted 
to conform to design values and to safety analyses. Training procedures and 
limiting conditions for operation are modified to reflect accurately the operating 
characteristics of the systems as built. 
(5) Operation: The operating organization exerts full responsibility for the safe 
operation of a nuclear power plant and, safety review procedures are maintained 
by the operating organization to provide a continuing surveillance and audit of 
plant operational safety. The operating organization is responsible for providing 
all equipment, staff, procedures and management practices necessary for safe 
operation, including the fostering of an environment in which safety is seen as a 
vital factor and a matter of personal accountability for all staff. Operation of the 
plant is conducted by authorized personnel, according to strict administrative 
controls and observing procedural discipline. The plant manager ensures that all 
elements for safe plant operation are in place, including an adequate number of 
qualified and experienced personnel. Safety review procedures are maintained 
by the operating organization to provide a continuing surveillance and audit of 
plant operational safety and to support the plant manager in the overall safety 
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responsibilities. A set of operational limits and conditions is defined to identify 
safe boundaries for plant operation. Minimum requirements are also set for the 
availability of staff and equipment. 
(6) Accident management: The results of an analysis of the response of the plant to 
potential accidents beyond the design basis are used in preparing guidance on 
an accident management strategy. Accident management includes constructive 
measures of operational personnel in the event of a severe accident, to prevent 
the accident from occurring and to mitigate its effects, including measures to 
protect the confinement function and to limit the release of radioactive material. 
The capability for accident mitigation has always been important in nuclear 
plant design. The use of confinement structures and containment systems is 
evidence of this objective. 
(7) Decommissioning: Consideration is given in design and plant operations to 
facilitating eventual decommissioning and waste management. After the end of 
operations and the removal of spent fuel from the plant, radiation hazards are 
managed so as to protect the health of workers and the public during plant 
decommissioning. A plant that is shut down remains an operating plant until its 
decommissioning and is subject to the normal control processes and procedures 
to ensure safety. In particular, the principles that govern a plant in a shutdown 
state apply. 
(8) Emergency preparedness: The emergency plans define the actions that would be 
taken in the event of a severe accident to re-establish control of the plant, to 
protect staff and the public, and to provide the necessary information speedily 
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to the regulatory organization and other authorities. Emergency planning and 
preparedness comprise activities necessary to ensure that, in the event of an 
accident, all actions necessary for the protection of the public and the plant staff 
could be carried out, and that decision making in the use of these services 
would be disciplined. Emergency planning zones defined around the plant 
provide a basic geographical framework for decision making on implementing 
protective measures as part of a graded response. These measures include as 
required early notification, sheltering and evacuation, radio-protective 
prophylaxis and supply of protective equipment, radiation monitoring, control 
of ingress and egress, decontamination, medical care, provision of food and 
water, control of agricultural products, and dissemination of information. 
While significant the guidance is given to process for design in a nuclear power plant, 
there are no restrictions or guidance related to the size or type of nuclear power plant. 
4.2 USNRC 10 CFR 
In case of USNRC 10 CFR, four of the most cited parts related to nuclear power plant 
safety are: 
(1) Part 20: Standards for Protection against Radiation; 
A. Establish standards for protection against ionizing radiation resulting from 
activities conducted under licenses issued by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission; 
B. Set requirements for total dose to individuals and controls the recieipt, 
possession, use, transfer, and disposal of licensed material by any licensee 
so that those dose levels are not exceeded. 
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(2) Part 50: Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities; 
A. As a requirement for obtaining an operating license or construction permit, 
to provide for the licensing of production and utilization facilities; 
B. Appendix A to Part 50: establishes necessary design, fabrication, 
construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, 
systems, and components important to safety; 
C. Appendix B to Part 50: Quality assurance requirements for the design, 
construction, and operation of all structures, systems, and components 
included in a production or utilization facility. 
(3) Part 52: Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants; 
A. Requirements for early site permits, standard design certifications, 
combined licenses, standard design approvals, and manufacturing licenses 
for nuclear power facilities licensed. 
(4) Part 100: Reactor Site Criteria; 
A. requirements for reactor site criteria based on population zones, and 
seismic activity. 
Appendix A ‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants’ of 10 CFR 50 divides 
the General Design Criteria (GDC) of nuclear power plants into six areas in terms of 
Overall Requirements, Protection by Multiple Fission Product Barriers, Protection and 
Reactivity Control Systems, Fluid Systems, Reactor Containment, Fuel and Radioactivity 
Control, and presents a total of 64 items [27].  
Note that there is no information in the USNRC regulation related to the specific reactor 
type or size. 
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4.3 Siting  
4.3.1 IAEA SSR-1 Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations 
 
The IAEA safety series provides procedures for meeting each criterion, but does not 
include specific details of the methods and techniques. In the case of IAEA, the general 
and specific standards for the siting of nuclear power plants are explained as follows [28].  
(1) General criteria; 
A. Selecting proposed sites and assessing their suitability for the construction 
of a nuclear power plant; 
B. Determining safety requirements related to a site; 
C. Evaluating the acceptability of a nuclear power plant. 
(2) Specific criteria; 
A. Effect of the region on the site on the plant; 
B. Effect of the plant on the region; 
C. Population considerations. 
In addition, sub-section 3.1.12 of the Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant 
Siting (IAEA Safety Series No. 50-C-S) [28] states that: 
“For each proposed site the potential radiological impact on people in the 
region during operational states and accident conditions, including those which 
could lead to emergency situations, shall be evaluated with due consideration 
of the relevant factors including population distribution, people’s diets, use of 




For areas within 10 km radius of the site, the population distribution is analyzed at 10-
year intervals from the reactor operation year to the end of its life. The concentric circles 
of 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 km of the reactor radius are divided into 16 orientations, and the 
resident population and the floating population status of each zone are analyzed. In this 
way, the IAEA also identifies the assessment of population distribution as an important 
factor. And, this criterion suggests the resident population and the floating population and 
the population density limitation [29]. 
4.3.2 USNRC  
 
The USNRC applies the following criteria for site selection of nuclear power plants in 10 
CFR 100.11 "Determination of exclusion area, low population zone, and population 
center distance" [30]. It is regulated based on the distance standard according to the 
amount of leaked radiation and the population density around the nuclear power 
generation facility in case of external leakage accident. 
(a) As an aid in evaluating a proposed site, an applicant should assume a 
fission product release; from the core, the expected demonstrable leak rate 
from the containment and the meteorological conditions pertinent to the site to 
derive an exclusion area, a low population zone and population centre distance. 
For the purpose of this analysis, which shall set forth the basis for the 
numerical values used, the applicant should determine the following: 
(1) An exclusion area of such size that an individual located at any point on 
its boundary for two hours immediately following onset of the postulated 
fission product release would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole 
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body in excess of 25 rem2 or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem2 to 
the thyroid from iodine exposure. 
(2) A low population zone of such size that an individual located at any 
point on its outer boundary who is exposed to the radioactive cloud 
resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire 
period of its passage) would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole 
body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to 
the thyroid from iodine exposure. 
(3) A population centre distance of at least one and one-third times the 
distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population zone. 
In applying this guide, the boundary of the population center shall be 
determined upon consideration of population distribution. Political 
boundaries are not controlling in the application of this guide. Where very 
large cities are involved, a greater distance may be necessary because of 
total integrated population dose consideration. 
4.4 Operation  
Regulatory standards for operators of existing large nuclear power plants can be found in 
the US NRC's 10 CFR 50.54 (m) [31]. Table 11 shows the minimum requirements per 




Table 11. Minimum Requirements Per Shift for On-Site Staffing of Nuclear Power Units 
by Operators and Senior Operators Licensed Under 10 CFR Part 55 [31]. 
 
 
These technical standards do not include consideration of specific reactor design methods 
or the size of nuclear facilities. 
4.5 Summary of key regulation requirements  
In order to construct and operate a nuclear power plant, a nuclear power licensee must 
prove that a nuclear power plant can be constructed and operated without any risk to the 
health, safety and environment of the operator and the public. To this end, regulatory 
bodies such as the IAEA and USNRC should establish technical standards for safety 
requirements and review whether nuclear power plants are constructed and operated 
properly in accordance with these safety requirements. The technical criteria related to 
the construction and operation of nuclear power plants discussed in 4.1 to 4.2 are 
summarized as follows. 
(1) The three basic safety functions of a nuclear power plant are classified into 




(2) These safety functions are accomplished through the installation of nuclear 
reactor protection systems and engineering safety equipment in accordance with 
the concept of defense in depth. 
(3) To achieve the basic safety functions of nuclear power plants, specific technical 




C. Manufacturing and Construction 
D. Commissioning 
E. Operation 
F. Accident management 
G. Decommissioning 
H. Emergency preparedness 
The current regulation and standards well discuss the above item but do not address 
specifics related to any reactor type of design. As such, SMR vendors are expected to 
make their own interpretations. While such interpretation can lead to a good design, it 
may not be optimal since the actual criteria are really based upon fissile load and residual 
heat load. Hence guidance in addressing heat load and fissile load more accurately for 
small reactor cores is beneficial. 
Considering the characteristics of the SMRs derived from Chapter 2 through the literature 
review, it is considered that siting and operation is not well covered in the current 
regulations. Therefore, literature reviews on regulatory standards for siting and operation 
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specified in the USNRC and IAEA were conducted in 4.3 and 4.4. Further, the ability to 
take advantage of passive safety system is not clear in the current standards. 
4.6 Establishment of criteria for SMRs regulation 
SMR differs from the current operating nuclear power plant in terms of design and 
operation characteristics such as nuclear fuel and safety systems. The criteria for the 
establishment of regulatory standards for SMRs stem from these differences, which 
necessitates a new direction for appropriate regulation. Therefore, in this report, when the 
technical standards for the regulation of nuclear power plants are applied to SMRs, the 
criterion that the graded approach is necessary or necessary to change is the gap between 
the characteristics of the SMRs and the existing regulatory standards. The characteristics 
of SMRs derived from literature review are as follows. 
(1) Fully passive safety system 
(2) Multi-unit modular reactor 
(3) Underground construction of containment buildings 
(4) Design of nuclear reactor internalization and integration 
Based on this, Chapter 5 describes the establishment of new regulatory standards for 
siting and operation among the existing regulatory standards for nuclear power plants. 
For the assessment of regulatory standards related to siting, the following criteria are 
considered to be the key elements for review: 
(1) Appropriate Emergency Planning Zone: Due to the low fissile load and the use 
of significant passive safety features in SMR designs, the size of the emergency 
planning zone can be significantly reduced or even eliminated for off site 
considerations.  i.e. reduced to the exclusion zone.   
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(2) Appropriate Exclusive Zone: Due to the low fissile load and the use of 
significant passive safety features in SMR designs, the size of the exclusion 
zone can be reduced.  However, a minimum exclusion zone is still required for 
SMRs as a function of the size of the fissile load. 
(3) Local Factors: The following local factors are more relevant for SMRs and need 
to be well correlated in the regulatory standards:  
A. Environmental Factors: climate and population 
B. Socio-Economic Factors: local economy 
C. Technical Efficiency Factors: climate and population 
For the assessment of regulatory standards related to operations, the following criteria are 
considered to be the key elements for review: 
(1) Due to the very small (less than more 10-3) CDF and LERF compared to 
conventional nuclear power plants, fewer staff are needed for accidents and 
mitigation. 
(2) Due to the small size of the total facility, and modular reactor design, fewer 
operator in MCR and patrol personnel in the field are required during normal 
operation. 






Chapter 5. Establishment of Regulatory Standards for SMRs 
From the results shown in Chapter 4, some of the regulatory standards will cover the 
majority of the needs for SMRs.  The regulations for most safety concerns are generic.  
Hence it is clearly possible to create a conceptual design based upon the existing 
regulatory standards. 
The two areas that are considered key are the regulations related to adoption of passive 
safety and principles of siting.  The current regulations for passive safety are not 
complete as they address the current plants with a significant dependency on active 
systems.  As such, there are likely improvements in the current regulations for either 
simplicity or clarity that may be beneficial for adopting for SMR applications.   
Siting of a nuclear power plant is the other key area where it is expected that can expect 
the potential for significant improvements in the regulations. The concept of siting and 
the key principles that affect siting are not expected to significantly change yet the 
specific criteria for each of those principles may change due to smaller fissile core loads 
and lower heat loads, hence less impact on the environment. 
Section 5.1 will discuss the safety related regulations from the perspective of passive 
safety.  The specific gaps and the nature of those gaps will be identified.  Section 5.2 will 
discuss the siting regulations from the perspective of the needs of the SMR.  This will 
include a discussion on where changes in the regulations may be required with specifics 
on the criteria.  Finally, section 5.3 will recommend the changes that should be done to 




SMRs have characteristics such as simplicity, small capacity, improved operating 
performance, unique safety function, passive design characteristics, and increased safety 
compared to existing nuclear power plants. These features allow SMRs to function 
without operator intervention in normal operating conditions, accidents and post-accident 
conditions. Thus, the operation of SMRs is generally more automatic and requires less 
operator intervention compared to existing nuclear power plants. Because of the design 
simplicity and more automated operating conditions of these SMRs, when a Design Basis 
Accident (DBA) or a Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA) occurs, the actions of the 
operator required to achieve a safe shutdown of the reactor and to establish a stabilized 
state of the plant will be reduced. The action of the operator will be passive observation 
and confirmation that confirms the state of the safety shutdown of the reactor or the state 
of the containment seal. For small nuclear facilities, the sites can be monitored and 
maintained by fewer operators. Therefore, the number of operators of SMRs can be 
expected to decrease compared to existing large nuclear power plants due to the reduction 
in complexity of their work. For this reason, given the characteristics of SMRs, 
regulatory standards for requirements related to operators of existing nuclear power 
plants are not appropriate. 
In addition, SMR type nuclear power plants will use modular-type reactor arrangements 
and operation. Since it is necessary to monitor and control multiple reactors in the 
centralized main control room, it is not appropriate to apply the operator number of 
SMRs according to the number of reactors as was shown in Table 9 (page 34). The 
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current regulations have a gap in their requirements to account for the benefit of passive 
safety features with respect to their operating modes. 
To determine the proper operation and the number of operators, it is necessary to 
understand and apply the unique design of the SMRs and the characteristics according to 
the differences between the existing nuclear power plants. To this end, the use of Risk-
Informed analysis and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for SMRs are expected. 
However, since the SMRs are still in the conceptual design phase or under development, 
there is still insufficient information on the design and operation of nuclear reactors and 
reactor facilities. In addition, inherent SMR reactor characteristics, which are 
fundamentally different from existing large nuclear power plants, have the problem that 
the criteria for risk measurement such as Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early 
Release Frequency (LERF) for SMRs reactors are not applicable or difficult to 
demonstrate as the design intent is to eliminate CDF and LERF. It is difficult to produce 
a complete PRA at this early stage of the research and development and application of 
SMRs reactors as the new passive safety features do not have operation experiences. 
Therefore, after commercialization of SMRs in the future, PRA information should be 
supplemented based on operational experience. Nevertheless, it is considered that PRA 
should be applied to siting and operation of SMRs. 
To apply PRA to SMRs, the selection of (IEs) and the preparation of accident scenarios 
should be preceded. Table 12 shows the Initiating Events Group of the SMRs presented 
in the Advanced SMR PRA Framework Technical Exchange Meeting [32]. The potential 
IEs were grouped into 36 IEs for SMRs, and Power Reactor Innovative Small Module 
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(PRISM) identified for the 21 IEs and 8 IEs for the Modular high-temperature gas-cooled 
reactor (MHTGR). 
 
Table 12. Identification of Initiating Events for aSMRs [32]. 
 
 
The main form of initiating events are transients which is common for all type of nuclear 
power plants. The next most common are pressure boundary breaks, support system 
failures, extended hazards, and shut-down refuelling issues. As the number of IEs is very 
small in comparison to a large nuclear power plant (>100), this suggests the PRA results 
could be very low. 
In summary, due to the characteristics of SMRs mentioned in Chapter 2, the frequency 
and probability of core damage and the probability of radiation leakage of SMRs are 
expected to be very low compared to existing nuclear power plants. As was shown in 
Table 3 (page 14), the CDF of some SMRs designs is 'Not applicable' or 'Not possible'. In 
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addition, the CDF of SMRs such as IRIS, NuScale, mPower, 4S, SVBR-100, etc. was 
evaluated as 10-8. Therefore, it is inappropriate to determine the number of operators of 
SMRs based on existing regulatory standards. The number of operators of SMRs is 
considered to be suitable to evaluate the risk of SMRs nuclear power plants to be applied. 
It is considered appropriate to establish the criteria for determining the number of 
operators of SMRs according to the calculation result after calculating the frequency of 
core damage, the frequency of radiation leakage, and the probability of radiation leakage 
per module or the total amount of power determined by the module. 
5.2 Siting 
As one of the conditions for the siting of traditional nuclear power plants, there was a 
need for large-scale transmission networks for the transmission of generated electricity, 
roads, railways, and ports for the transport of machinery and equipment for the 
construction and operation of nuclear power plants. However, as can be seen from the 
fundamental characteristics of the SMRs described in Chapter 2, SMRs require only 
minimal facilities to transport the modules produced by the factory due to their small 
mass and size. Less transmission lines are needed to supply the generated electricity to 
nearby electricity consumers. Therefore, it is considered inappropriate to apply the 
standard of siting of traditional nuclear power plants. 
In case of SMRs, according to the characteristics of the SMRs discussed in Chapter 2, the 
characteristics of the locations where SMRs are expected to be constructed are as follows 
[33].  
SMRs may be located on sites that differ from where traditional nuclear power plants 
have been built. For example, SMRs may be established: 
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- on small grids where power generation needs are usually less than 300 
megawatt electric (MWe) per facility 
- at edge-of-grid or off-grid locations where power needs are small – in the 
range of 2 to 30 MWe 
For example, the location of the construction of SMRs expected in Canada is shown 
Figure 10 [34]. Figure 10 identifies oil sands, high-temperature steam for heavy industry, 
replacing conventional coal-fired power, and remote communities and mines as suitable 
locations for SMRs. 
 
 




Both smaller in size and in energy output, SMRs are considered ideal for deployment 
both on-grid and off-grid in remote locations such as mine sites or the oil sands, as well 
as willing communities in northern Canada reliant on diesel-fuelled generators for 
electricity. In addition, these technologies can also be utilized in other industrial 
applications such as production of hydrogen, local area heating, or other industrial heat 
applications [35]. Thus, in Canada, the applicability and availability of SMRs are much 
more likely to be realized than in other countries because of accumulated technology and 
geographical conditions that fit well with the siting conditions of SMRs [36]. 
Recent studies on the site selection of SMRs have also raised the need for site selection 
that reflects the characteristics of SMRs. Harvel [37] conducted an assessment of site 
selection for SMRs for remote communities and mines in Canada using site evaluation 
methods for nuclear power plants in various ways. Given the nature of SMRs, it is 
inappropriate to select sites that are both traditional and more modern and quantitative. 
The site selection method for the production of electricity and the enhancement of 
community safety, which is the fundamental goal of existing large nuclear power plants, 
is not suitable to be applied to site selection of SMRs because of the difference in the 
fundamental objectives with SMRs having various purposes, efficiency and flexibility. 
This evaluation is in good agreement with the difference from the existing nuclear power 
plant due to the characteristics of SMRs mentioned in Chapter 2. This paper suggests that 
the impact of SMRs, mines or communities, and the additional facilities needed to 
support these mines and communities should be included in the assessment to assess the 
siting, so that the impact of the site selection process will be more accurate. 
61 
 
In short, the criteria for site selection of SMRs should be differentiated from those of 
existing nuclear power plants. Firstly, the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) are not 
considered due to the nature of the nearly fully passive engineered safety features of 
SMRs and the underground construction of containment buildings. If an EPZ is required, 
then an appropriate minimum setting is preferred. The consequences of an emergency 
scenario are not likely to be significant off site due to the low fissile load. 
The criteria of the EPZ for the nuclear power plants of each country are as follows: In the 
United States, 10 miles are set as the radiation exposure pathway EPZ, and 50 miles as 
the food ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. In Japan, the EPZ is calculated and set the 
amount of potential radioactive material leakage from the theoretical accident through the 
nuclear safety analysis and establishes an 8-10 km evacuation zone for the nuclear power 
plant. The United Kingdom does not specify an EPZ scope. The UK selects reference 
accidents that may occur at each nuclear facility. After that, the EPZ is set up by 
conducting accident analysis on these reference accidents (Typically 1 to 3 km) 
Table 13 shows the emergency planning area by category of nuclear facilities, as 
described in the IAEA Safety Guide No. GS-G-2.1, APPENDIX II: AREA AND ZONE 
SIZES [38]. SMR nuclear power plants would be included in 'Reactors 100 ~ 1000 MW 
(th)' of Category I facility category. The emergency planning area of the item will be 
applied to Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ) within 3 km and Urgent Protective action 
planning Zone (UPZ) within 30 km. Yet these values are much higher than necessary for 




Table 13. Suggested Emergency Zones and Area sizes (IAEA) [38]. 
 
 
Furthermore, according to the WNA report on the EPZ, the EPZ for SMRs should be 
limited to within 300 m, since small reactors are considered to replace fossil fuel power 
plants in many situations [39]. Conventional large-scale nuclear power plants were built 
away from population centres. However, the characteristics and purpose of SMRs are 
small power supply, district heating, and desalination water supply for low population 
and remote areas where large scale transmission networks are impossible. Therefore, the 
limitation criteria related to the population around the nuclear power plant, which has 
been an important factor in siting in the existing regulatory standards, are not significant. 
Although it is necessary to prepare basic data and characterization of the population 
distribution around the site for the site selection of the SMRs, it is inappropriate to apply 
it to the criteria of the siting of the SMRs. Secondly, the criterion for siting of SMRs 
should be considered as the most important factor of radiation dose after accident. In the 
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SMRs where containment buildings are constructed underground, the frequency and 
magnitude of radiation accident occurrences are very different from those of existing 
nuclear power plants, so, the existing siting restriction zone must be changed. The 
detailed numerical values should be determined through the accident analysis calculated 
considering the design details of the SMRs to be applied to nuclear power plant 
construction, radiation protection characteristics, and characteristics of the engineered 
safety features. There is clearly an individual characteristic according to the reactor-type 
of SMRs such as light-water reactor, heavy-water reactor, or High-Temperature Gas-
cooled Reactor (HTGR) or Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR). Therefore, it is 
considered that the appropriate bounding source term should be set according to the 
reactor-type in the detailed accident analysis. The Exclusive Zone provides the minimum 
separation distance for the safe protection of SMRs facilities, so it is appropriate to 
maintain the existing standards. 
In conclusion, due to the characteristics of SMRs such as small capacity, low power 
density, low severe accident probability, slow accident progression, small radioactive 
accident per module, SMRs can extremely limit the radiation leakage to the outside even 
in the event of a severe accident, and the progress of the accident is also very limited. 
Therefore, it is considered that the EPZ other than the Exclusive Zone is not considered 
or the minimum setting should be applied. And, in the case of setting the siting limit 
zone, the design of the specific SMRs to be applied and the evaluation of the leakage 
radiation dose at the accident should be considered as the main factors of the site 
selection. Finally, in assessing site selection for SMRs, the impact of SMRs on the 
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surrounding area, mine or community, and any additional facilities needed to support 
them should be included in the assessment. 
5.3 Recommended Changes to Regulatory Standards 
Many of the regulations that currently exist already address many of the needs of an SMR 
plant.  Hence, the creation of a unique set of regulations to address SMRs is not a 
recommended pathway.  While a unique set would be clearer to understand, the workload 
to essentially copy several standards would still be significant and it may be perceived as 
producing a lesser standard.  Instead, most of the current standards could either be used as 
is or have slight modifications to accommodate the unique requirements of SMRs. 
That said, for SMR technology to progress, this work suggests that two areas of 
regulations should be updated fairly early in the process to allow for the regulations to be 
incorporated into SMR design.   
The first set of regulations that should be updated/modified are those associated with the 
adoption of passive safety systems.  The SMRs will use a significant amount of 
simplification and passive features.  The current regulations do not encourage this as 
defense in depth requires multiple barriers and usually considers both active and passive 
barriers.  To include the same number of active and passive barriers in smaller designs 
does not necessarily improve the design or make it safer as the additional barrier does not 
necessarily cause a significant improvement in the benefit.  Hence, a clear understanding 
of the nature of the risk is important so that designers can concentrate on the passive 
features and minimize or eliminate the use of unnecessary systems.  These regulations are 
of a higher priority as they directly influence the design phase which the SMR vendors 
currently are working. 
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Due to the low probability failure and the reduction in the number of tasks for the 
operators, a reduction in the number of operators can occur even for multi-unit control 
rooms. Establishing a better relationship of PRA to control room operator requirements is 
therefore a recommended change to the regulatory standards. 
The second set of regulations that should be updated/modified are those associated with 
siting.  Essentially, due to the SMR small size, many sites that would be unacceptable to 
a large nuclear power plant are now options available to SMRs.  Yet this is largely due to 
the consequence of size.  One of the main advantages of SMRs is to build them in lots 
and as such the site needs to consider expansion of additional units.  This may result in a 
site that initially is acceptable but over time is not acceptable as the number of units 
increases.  Guidance on how to balance size and the site is necessary for the SMR designs 




Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks  
Demand for SMRs is expected to increase globally to provide stable and economical 
power to regions such as the need to replace aging thermal power plants, remote areas 
without power grids, and developing countries with difficulties in attracting large nuclear 
power plants. Research and development of innovative design SMRs in Canada, the 
United States, and other countries is entering the visualization phase. However, there are 
few standards for licensing and regulating SMRs that are differentiated from existing 
large-scale nuclear power plants. For the development of SMRs regulatory technology, 
this report explored the characteristics of SMRs design, manufacture and construction as 
follows. 
(1) Fully passive safety system: Improved safety by applying inherent design 
characteristics and fully passive concept of engineered safety features 
(2) Multi-unit modular reactor: It is possible to set power generation capacity by 
determining the number of modules according to power demand. 
(3) Underground construction of containment buildings: The possibility of external 
leakage of radioactive materials is very rare and achieves a high level of 
containment. 
(4) Design of nuclear reactor internalization and integration: Design of main 
devices to be located inside the reactor to pursue an integral reactor. 
In addition, the guidelines for the siting of SMRs and the number of operators of SMRs 
facilities, which are deemed inappropriate to apply the existing large nuclear power plant 





A. It is considered that the EPZ other than the Exclusive Zone is not 
considered or the minimum setting should be applied. 
B. In the case of setting the siting limit zone, the design of the specific SMRs 
to be applied and the evaluation of the leakage radiation dose at the 
accident should be considered as the main factors of the site selection. 
C. The impact of SMRs on the surrounding area, mine or community, and any 
additional facilities needed to support them should be included in the 
assessment. 
(2) Operation 
A. Based on the results of the PRA per module or the total number of modules 
for the determined amount of power, the criteria for determining the 
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